THEME I: THE COMPARATIVE RISE OF FRANCOPHONE FIRMS
The purchase of the Shawinigan Water and Power by Hydro Quebec in December 1962 is often seen as a symbol of the Quiet Revolution, but it was part of a much longer and less mythologized historical process (Paquet, 1988 Doubleday, New York, in 1971.) with industry, particularly in the sixties, the language of work that you had to work in was English, and that was it, and that was no problem. And when we were working with municipalities..or the Quebec government, it was French, and that was no problem....We've always been in the position to work in the language of the client...We felt that, since we were a service company, the lan guage was the language of the client. Refusing to believe in the possibility of its being taken over, the company had neglected to take any steps to smoothe the path of its non-electrical subsidiaries in such an eventuality. In quick succession, Shawinigan Engineering found itself the property of the Quebec government, Power Corporation, and finally its own employees; it had lost its major client and was in an uneasy political position in Quebec where its activity had been concentrated.
Although Montreal Engineering, and to a lesser extent Shawinigan Engineering, grew and diversified both technologically and geographi cally in the 1970's, some problems due to lack of marketing experi ence were acknowledged. As Denovan said, "The trouble with some of the people in Shawinigan Engineering in those days was, they were damn good engineers, but they weren't very good businessmen; in fact, most of us were in that category." (p. Shawinigan...were not used to running after the work, the contracts. They were used to being given by Shawinigan Water and Power anything they Scientia canadensis 87 needed. They were good engineers, but I don't think they had good commer cial people...They were sitting down and waiting for the work to come to them by itself.
During these years there were quite a lot of changes in the firms of consulting engineering -the last 25 or 30 years, the engineers started to run madly to get jobs. And at the time you were sitting in your office and waiting for somebody to give you a job, you know, just like a doctor. But this is not like that today. I remember Mr. Valois used to tell us over here: "Nobody will come to you in your office; you don't need a big office because nobody will come to give you a job in your office; you have to go to his office to get the job." ( Boyd was clearly promoting a type of public-private collaboration not popular with most of the private firms at that time.
As president of SNC at that juncture, Camille Dagenais was reluc tant to comment on the choice of team, but on the policy of separa tion between management and engineering, he said: I can only answer from where I stand; for the benefit of consulting engineer ing, and the environment in which we [work], which is the environment in which you have to be able to do the whole thing... from the point of view of making the consulting engineer companies in Quebec become larger and very important and capable of being competitive with some of the bigger ones out side, it was not a good move. You have to be able to do the management, and the engineering, and the whole job [From] the government's point of view, I suppose that they had many reasons to divide the work into many. (Camille Dagenais, SNC, June 1990, p.6) Jean-Paul Gourdeau, Dagenais' second in command at the time, also felt that to obtain jobs abroad, a combination of experience in large project management and engineering expertise was necessary. He mentioned other factors in the choice:
The government decided that there should be a separate company, the energy corporation...the president was Mr.
[Pierre] Nadeau. He decided that he want ed to have a complete separate team, and this is when we were asked to form a consortium ...we made an offer, and I guess there was a confrontation with Hydro Quebec...Mr. Nadeau lost out and Hydro Quebec decided that they wanted a new group, and since we [had been] asked to form a group with M. Nadeau, we couldn't be the fair-haired boy of the new group, and so we lost out. Like anything else, in a project like this you do your best, but there is no second prize; you either get the job or you don't. The big responsibility of James Bay was getting this structure going and selling the idea of how it was going to work: first, you can't be an engineer and a manager;... [second] the work had to be done in French. Third: how to inte grate three firms like that: Hydro Quebec with its big hat; Bechtel was a bigger hat internationally, they thought everything they did was right; and Lavalin, who was really growing. I had to knock in their heads a lot: there's ONE com pany, SEBJ; we ALL wear the SEBJ hat, forget the other hats, and the way it's going to be done is the way we discuss, and this is OUR way. (Robert Boyd, p.7)
The James Bay project undoubtedly provided a boost to consulting engineering in Montreal: to the many civil engineering firms involved in infrastructure; to the three principal hydroelectric firms -ABBDL, RSW, and, to a much lesser extent than hoped, SNC, whose involve ment included the LG2 powerhouse; but above all, to Lavalin. SNC and Monenco, both of whose former presidents have cited Bechtel as their model (Mulherin, p.6; Dagenais, p.4), had already participated in major projects overseas, and continued to do so; they also expanded in the oil and gas industries.
Lavalin's participation in the James Bay project allowed it to growfinancially, technologically, and geographically -to a position equalling and surpassing its Montreal competitors. By comparison with them, Lavalin was lacking in hydroelectric experience (which, according to the principle of separation of engineering and manage ment, would have been of little use anyway for James Bay); this lack was filled by the acquisition of Shawinigan Engineering in 1982, dur ing the lull following the completion of James Bay, phase 1.
In summary, the most basic issue in the choice of management teams for James Bay I, aside from all the political considerations, appears to have been the conflict between the total service concept, which is analogous to the concept of "turnkey" plants and the "black box" view of technology, in which the expertise is exercised only by the chosen experts; and the concept of cooperation among different organisms, public and private, representing different political and entrepreneurial purposes, in the carrying out of a major project.
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CONCLUSION: FORCED TOGETHERNESS
The desire to work alone, to have complete control and responsibility for a project, as the simplest way to do an efficient job, was common to all of the firms. In cases where a firm needed new expertise, the method of spawning its own subsidiary or buying an orphan or dying firm, was common. In many other cases, joint ventures were formed where either political interests (e.g., host governments to Canadian firms working abroad) or technical requirements (e.g., hydroelectric experience in difficult climatic conditions) made it necessary to cooperate.
Some projects were of such a grand scale that no one firm could do it, and be afterwards able to support the enormous staff that would be required to complete such projects. In order to obtain federal (e.g., CIDA -Canadian International Development Agency, EDC -Export Development Corporation) or international (e.g., World Bank) funding for projects abroad, cooperation has often been required, taking the form of a consortium. These have been seen as unattractive, but essential, means of obtaining projects. Some responses, when asked about the extent of participation in consortia:
As little as possible! We're big enough to swallow all the engineering firms in Canada..we probably have 15% of all the engineering manpower in Canada..we operate in all types of fields, so why should we join a consortium? . A question of special interest to historians as "company genealo gists" is that of the process of fusing and/or clashing of cultures in company mergers. We may begin with the idea, common in the social sciences, that in the encounter between two previously separate cul tures, the process of acculturation may produce something entirely new, containing elements of the cultures of the old components; and creating a new entity which (depending upon the relative power of the two entities, and upon the desires of the managers) may or may not retain the characteristics of both components.
We will take the culture of the now dominant SNC component as given: a more or less typical world-class, internationally and multiculturally oriented, bureaucratic organization operating in the consulting engineering, construction, and manufacturing sectors. The question of the survival of the Lavalin and Shawinigan identities is an interest ing one.
As for Shawinigan, at least its name has been preserved, and as long as projects started before the merger continue, the group of engineers employed by the former Shawinigan-Lavalin subsidiary of Lavalin will function as before. It is only as new projects are begun that the cre ation of a new, fused identity will begin to form.
An extremely useful perspective on this process was provided by an interview with Jo-Ann Paquet, whose career also reflects some impor tant tendencies in the evolution of the engineering profession. As rep resentative within SNC-Shawinigan of a group temporarily labelled "groupe corporatif en qualité," she works to monitor and improve what is often called in English "total quality management," a term whose definition includes attention to interaction with the client, and to favorable working conditions for employees. While a discussion of this concept is out of place here, she stated strongly her conviction that "quality" is indeed something that must be managed, or fostered; it is not something that occurs automatically (as anyone who has experienced arrogance in "expert" consultants, or stultifying working conditions, will testify). Her particular mandate is to smoothe the transition as SNC and Shawinigan engineers begin working together on new projects.
Jo-Ann Paquet's career illustrates the speed with which the modern engineer may move into adminstration; graduating in metallurgical engineering from Laval in 1983, she worked only four years in that field with Alcan before entering the field of quality control, or quality management, joining Lavalin in 1990.
Disons que je n'ai pas la réputation d'être le parfait stéréotype de l'ingénieur. Je suis peu intéressée par les machines; je suis beaucoup plus attirée par les gens qui opèrent les machines. C'est la raison fondamentale qui m'a amené à m'intéresser à la gestion de la qualité. 0-A Paquet, April 28, 1992)
The career trajectory by which the management of people succeeds the process of producing designs, specification, and machines as the principal interest of engineers, is increasingly common as the relative importance of project design rather than planning the manipulation of material objects becomes the central function of an engineering firm.
A tendency toward democratization of the workplace was also evi dent in the fact that the Association québécoise de la qualité (of whose Montreal region Jo-Ann Paquet was president at the time of our interview) includes members from retail stores with three employ ees as well as from firms the size of Bell Canada.
An aspect of "company culture" which emerged from several visits to Lavalin is the unusually widespread prevalence of beauty and care in the design and decoration of the workplace, and the prominent position given to the visual arts, leading-edge and modern as well as traditional, not just in the boardrooms but throughout the building, extending to a public gallery in the basement. Art had clearly been more than a good investment and a way of making corporate clients feel more at home in the executive offices as is the case with many companies. At the second interview (April 28, 1992), when Bernard Lamarre had slightly (but not much) more time than he had had as president of Lavalin, to give to questions not strictly of a business nature, we asked him whether this pervasive evidence of the love of art had been a self-conscious plan or had just happened. It emerged that, while it had started as a hobby, it had assumed an important role in company management:
It started as a personal interest...my wife, our family, were always interested in art, especially the visual arts; as a young couple we visited museums...I became almost an art addict. At first we kept that for ourselves, but later -you cannot separate yourself and have it in your home, and come into the office where it is completely different. So we started to bring some works of art into the office. When I brought Leo Rosshandler in, it was a very definite policy to try to integrate works of art within the work environment.
..[we thought that] if we brought in meaningful works of art, by interesting the personnel and raising their curiosity in visual arts, they would also have curiosity for other forms of art...Of course the first time we brought in modern works of art, they thought we had fallen on our heads.. You know, they were not used to that, didn't have much contect with it, but they started to ask themselves questions -what was behind the abstract, and all that -from that we went to maybe music.If you are curious about art, then you start also to be curious about what you do every day of your life in engineering, and you start questioning the methods you have been applying all the time; maybe there is something that could be changed... it's creating a very intensive intellectual debate; it's good for everybody, on the art side and on the technical and business side. (Lamarre, SNC-Lavalin, April 28, 1992) It seemed to us, after seeing this company in operation in 1989 and 1990 , that Lamarre and his associates had set (and presumably will continue to set, in other ways), an example of the possibility of a humane, culturally rich environment in a technological, traditionally arid and forbidding, part of the economy.
Lamarre went on to tell how, even before he had a public gallery in the basement, they arranged travelling exhibitions, to make Quebec artists known in the west, and western artists known in Quebec -"at least, to bring those two solitudes together on something on which there was not any big discussion....you know, you don't knock heads off with art. You don't need to speak French, or English, to communi cate..." Thus art was a instrument of change, not only within the company environment, but in the surrounding society.
We will address only briefly the second question posed about the future of the combined firms in their relationship to Hydro Quebec, particularly in reference to James Bay, phase two, the Grande Scientia canadensis 99 
